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Abstract
Cybersecurity is becoming more and more relevant. Autonomous vehicles handle large amounts of data and can connect to more 
and more existing devices, smartphones, tablets, or even other cars and systems. This poses the risk of unauthorized access to data. 
Theoretically cars have separate computer units, operate in isolation, and are not connected, so there is less possibility to be attacked. 
However if the vehicles are interconnected, hackers can have easier access to personal data. They can get information about the 
location of the car owner, their typical trips, and, for example, allow an intruder to know when the tracked person is not at home. 
Furthermore it can also be happened that the vehicle operation is maliciously disturbed, which can result in a security risk for the 
passengers. In extreme cases, computer terrorist attacks can also be prepared - large-scale interventions on roads can lead to chaos 
across a region or country. In accordance with the introduced threats, it is a crucial objective of this research to indicate specific 
methods, which can help the industry to evaluate and prepare for these kinds of attacks in a proper way.
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1 Introduction
With the increasing attention towards connected autono-
mous vehicles [CAV] in the current years from both the man-
ufacturer and the customer side, it is more and more import-
ant to talk about safety and security (Tettamanti et al., 2016). 
Safety and security are both qualities that concern the over-
all system (Zöldy, 2019). But in general, these frameworks 
are handled separately in the vehicle industry. Improvement 
of traditional mechanical components with redundant inher-
ent elements is in the focus of the functional safety standard-
ization (ISO 26262) (Martin et al., 2017). In contrast to this, 
security topics are traditionally seen as attacks of a mechan-
ical nature and as only affecting single vehicles (e.g. door 
lock and immobilizer related). Because of the spread of 
vehicular system networks (e.g. V2X), novel development 
objectives like automated vehicles, and on the air software 
updates, it is no more tolerable to expect that vehicles are not 
effected by cyber threats.
Since the introduction of Electronic Control Units [ECUs] 
in the automotive production process, the complexity of 
such inherent component frameworks has increased reason-
ably. According to professional estimation, 80 % of manu-
facturing related research activities was performed in the 
field of inherent vehicular systems in the previous years. 
Furthermore, nowadays the fast developments of informa-
tion technology significantly contribute to the spread of V2X 
features. Bluetooth and internet interfaces are built in the 
newly produced vehicles and these lead the vehicle to new 
kind of risk arriving from the cyberspace. Summing up, 
the vehicle domain needs novel methods to improve cyber-
security (Szíjj et al., 2015) and safety focused development 
processes (Macher et al., 2016).
This paper aims to give some insight on the possi-
ble failures caused by cyberattacks by the application of 
a classical safety analysis for a specific automated func-
tion. This article specifically focuses on the highway-pi-
lot function. The effect of cyber-attacks on safety will be 
in focus and not method and execution of cyber-attacks 
themselves. The research tries to indicate which failure 
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modes can be caused by cyber-attacks and try to define 
plans for their prevention. It needs to be expressed that 
this paper rather focuses on the possibility of sign and data 
spoofing than a direct vehicle attack scenario.
At first the most important references are introduced, 
which have been used during the research. This study is 
based on the following articles.
At first the current threat and risk assessment method-
ologies have been studied through Georg Macher's arti-
cle. This paper attempts to indicate a similarities between 
available automotive safety and security related models. 
The outcomes present that the vehicle industry have not 
focused on security threats so far. Additionally, the arti-
cle presents a model to cluster cyber-security risks and to 
contract safety and security evaluation. One good exam-
ple for this approach is the Safety-Aware Hazard and Risk 
Assessment (SAHARA) method (Macher et al., 2016).
In the next step, existing safety analysis methodologies 
have been studied for a starting point. The chosen method is 
Failure Mode and Effect analysis because it is very common 
in the automotive industry. To do this the article of Struss 
and Fraracci (2012) has been evaluated. This paper is about 
a model-based automation of Failure Modes and Effect 
Analysis applied to a hydraulic part of a vehicle braking sys-
tem. Although it focuses on the automation of the analysis, 
it provides good insight on the steps of an FMEA and how 
it is applied in an automotive environment. The FMEA's 
description from the SAE standard is as follows.
Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) is a ratio-
nal and well-constructed system- and also compo-
nent-scale evaluation. Potential failure modes are deter-
mined during the analysis, beside this the relevant causes 
and the expected effects related to the given the failure 
mode and the related severity scaling are also identified 
(SAE, 1993; Struss and Fraracci, 2012).
The rest of the sources focus on cyber-attacks or cyber-se-
curity related to CAVs. The first one focuses on cyber-at-
tacks against connected automated vehicles (CAV). It pres-
ents the state-of-the-art methods to prevent these attacks and 
investigates another type of attack, the so-called slight-at-
tacks. The paper concludes that when one CAV is under 
slight attacks, it is more risky if transmitted locations are 
influenced than velocities; if more connected vehicles 
are attacked, it may be more dangerous if many vehicles 
are influenced with low severity outcomes than if a small 
amount of vehicles are influenced with higher severity out-
comes; furthermore, the result of slight-attacks can be more 
dangerous at deceleration than acceleration (Li et al., 2018).
The second article overviews different passive and 
active cyber-attacks on CAVs and presents solutions 
for each of these attacks based on the state-of-the-art 
methods and discusses possible improvement orientations 
in the field of CAV related cybersecurity (He et al., 2017).
Finally, the last article provides a brief overview of main 
cybersecurity threats on three relevant security fields of 
today – e-mobility, car sharing and automated valet park-
ing. The article also discusses briefly the main protection 
concepts (Haas and Möller, 2017).
2 Method
Aiming to keep the methodology as simple as possible, 
a very specific case is examined. First, an FMEA of a high-
way-pilot CAV function has been performed. The analysis 
covers only the main failure modes and the aspect of secu-
rity have been in the focus of the evaluation. Each fail-
ure mode and its effects are examined to decide whether 
they could be caused by cyber-attacks or not. Beside this 
objective prevention plans have been provided in each 
case. Beside the investigation of CAVs, it is also import-
ant to examine attacks targeting the infrastructure or other 
vehicles to some extent because falsified data can also 
cause critical impact related to the transportation process.
The FMEA is proved to be an effective method to start 
the investigation since it is applied widespread in the auto-
motive industry, so most of the automated vehicle functions 
probably have already gone through a detailed evaluation 
or are going to be the subject of a related analysis in the 
near future. Because of its well applicability, many studies 
have already performed different FMEA related investiga-
tion. The main objective of the method is to substantially 
go through all potential component faults and estimate 
their effects on the analyzed functionality of the system 
in order to assess whether it can lead to a critical situation 
and violate safety requirements. Another important rea-
son, why FMEA are so frequently used is its model based 
characteristic. Because of this, it can be used early in the 
design stage. On the other hand it also has to be mentioned 
that it is closer to qualitative methods than to numerical 
models, however it is completed with the identification of 
the risk priority number. The main design steps of FMEA 
process is presented in Fig. 1 (Struss and Fraracci, 2012).
3 Results
As mentioned earlier, the first step of the evaluation 
after the initial planning is the Failure Modes and Effect 
Analysis. The resulting FMEA can be seen in Table 1.
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Severity, occurrence and detectability values are 
rated according to the main concept of the method and 
so the Risk Probability Number [RPN] is defined. 
These numbers are significantly relevant for our analysis 
since most of the failure modes are analyzed thoroughly. 
However, the Current Design Controls column is also left 
out, it is too specific, it differs for every OEM and in most 
cases, it is not necessary for our research.
The first step is to determine the items, functions or 
components we wish to examine. These should be cho-
sen so that they cover the whole system. Based on the 







The radar and camera systems are responsible for the 
perception of the environment and for creating the situa-
tion analysis so that the main system can work with abstract 
data of the objects and the environment. The electronic sta-
bility control unit is the main coordinator of the function. 
Table 1 The FMEA table of an ESP related cyberattack
Item / 
Function Potential Failure Mode Potential Effect of Failure Potential Cause S O D RPN
Radar
False positive object detection
Unnecessary braking Software error
7
3 1 21
Lane-change cannot be executed
Sensor failure
4 1 28
False lane model 5 4 140









Electric fire 2 3 24
Camera
False object classification
Unnecessary braking Software error
6
2 2 24
Lane-change cannot be executed
Sensor failure
3 1 18











No braking when needed 2 7 112





Electric fire 2 3 18
Changed vehicle dynamics 4 4 48
Speed 
Sensor False speed signal
False situation analysis of other systems Sensor failure
5
2 1 10
Not the desired amount of brake force Cyber-attack 3 5 75
Brake 
Sensor
False positive brake signal
Not the desired amount of brake force Sensor failure
6
3 1 18
No braking when needed Cyber-attack 2 5 60




Cyber-attack 2 5 40
Fig. 1 FMEA phases
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Every demand related accelerating and braking has 
to be sent to the stability control first and it performs 
the demanded action considering the vehicle's dynamic 
parameters and the physical boundaries.
Speed and brake sensor have been analyzed addition-
ally compared to the traditional system description due 
to cyber-security considerations. These sensors send 
their data on the CAN network that can potentially be vul-
nerable to cyber-attacks. A false signal from these sensors 
can cause serious malfunctions in the system but more of 
this later. In addition, a Highway Assist or Highway Pilot 
system uses data from other sensors but these two are 
the most important as they provide information about the 
state of the vehicle dynamics.
3.1 Radar system
The radar system is the most important component for situ-
ation analysis. It usually consists of a long-range and a medi-
um-range or a short-range radar on the front and a medi-
um-range radar at the rear of the vehicle. The radars are 
responsible for detecting and classifying the objects in the 
environment of the vehicle, so it is crucial that the objects 
are indeed detected and classified properly. On Fig. 2, 
the area that these radars can scan can be seen, including 
the range of the ultrasonic sensors around the vehicle.
From a logical point of view, the radar system can have 
three potential failure modes:
• False positive object detection
• False negative object detection
• Electronic component failure.
Of course, an FMEA (Ford) can be made for the radar 
system and its components also, thus further analysis 
regarding its possible failure modes and their effects and 
potential causes is possible (Martin et al., 2016) but in our 
case, the three failure modes are enough.
False positive object detection means that the system 
detected an object somewhere, when in reality there is no 
object. This is less dangerous but the manufacturers should 
still be prepared to handle these situations. The potential 
effects of this failure can be mainly unnecessary braking, 
false lane model and non-executable lane-change.
The unnecessary braking could be dangerous and of 
course inconvenient for the passengers and results in an 
unpredictable driving mode, that can confuse other driv-
ers. A false lane model can also be dangerous, since if 
the system cannot determine the course of the lane prop-
erly, the vehicle can leave the lane. The implications of 
this on a multi-lane driving environment is quite clear, 
although the system considers other objects as well, so 
the braking of the whole lane-model is not that likely. 
Other effect can be a non-executable lane-change, because 
the system falsely detects an object in the way. These 
effects can be caused by errors or deficiency in the soft-
ware or failure of the sensors. Cyber-attacks as a cause are 
not that likely. The radar system is usually not exposed 
to any outside network and even if an outside attack hap-
pened, it is hard to create a sudden, dangerous situation.
In case of false negative object detection, the system 
does not detect objects that are there in reality. This is 
more severe than the false positive case because objects not 
detected can lead to a collision, as it is one of the potential 
effects. For instance if the system does no detect a vehicle 
in front or in the next lane, that vehicle will not be calculated 
in the planned trajectory and a collision can happen with-
out any brake-force applied. The other effect can be a false 
lane model, which is very similar to the false positive case, 
since the lane model is created with the detected and clas-
sified objects considered. Considering cyber-attacks, it is 
similar to the previous failure mode. Compromising one 
or few object's data will not cause serious malfunctions, 
especially if sensor-fusion is implemented, so cyber-at-
tacks are not in focus in this case.
The third failure mode is electronic component fail-
ure. This contains many possible failures but analyzing 
these is not in the scope of this study. This failure can 
cause the whole system to shut down or cause electric 
fire if not handled correctly. Electronic component fail-
ures can be caused by manufacturing errors or wear. 
Obviously, cyber-attacks are not considered in this case.Fig. 2 Radars in highly automated vehicles (innovation-destination)
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3.2 Camera system
The camera system is used mainly to help the radar sys-
tem with object classification and lane detection in a 
sensor-fusion. Its capabilities to determine distance to 
an object is very limited. For our study, two main failure 
modes have been chosen: false object classification and 
electronic component failure.
In our case, not much can be said about electronic com-
ponent failure. Its effects and causes are the same as in the 
case of radar systems. Additionally, it does not come in to 
consideration in case of cyber-attacks.
Falsely classified objects can lead to serious effects like 
non-executable lane-change, unnecessary braking or even 
collision, if not compensated properly with other sensor 
data. In next step let's consider a case where the camera 
system cannot identify a vehicle and send data describ-
ing the environment without any indicated object in front 
of the ego vehicle. This could obviously lead to an acci-
dent if the other sensors also do not detect the object. 
Also problematic, if the lanes are detected falsely by the 
camera system and the vehicle leaves the real lanes 
because of a wrong lane-model.
As for the causes of these failure modes, the results are 
similar to the radar systems. A software error, for exam-
ple, can easily cause failures like this. Other causes 
include sensor failures; this can produce a similar effect. 
Considering cyber-attacks, the situation is the same 
as in the case of radar systems. These sensors usually 
work in fusion, so an attack against the camera sys-
tem alone should not cause serious issues in most cases. 
Additionally, this system should also be isolated, thus mak-
ing the attacker's job harder to cause any malfunctions.
3.3 ESP
The Electronic Stability Program is a safety-critical function 
and it can be found in every commercial vehicle since 2014. 
Every request from other functions to change vehicle dynam-
ics have to go through the ESP first. It decides if the requested 
action can be executed and to what extent. Without request, 
it continuously monitors the vehicle's movement parameters 
and encroaches if necessary. This means that it is crucial 
for the ESP not to be compromised.
Two main failure modes have been evaluated for our 
case: false situation analysis and electronic component fail-
ure. First, the second case is presented as it is more straight-
forward. Electronic component failure is similar as in the 
previous cases. It can be caused by manufacturing errors or 
wear and it can result in system shutdown, electrical fire or 
if the failed component is not that critical, it can cause mal-
functions in the system. It means that the ESP can modify 
vehicle dynamics the wrong way, causing the car to behave 
differently, it could become hard to control.
The other possible failure mode is more interesting 
according to our concept as false situation analysis can 
be a result of a cyber-attack. Since the ESP gets most 
of the information it requires from the CAN network, 
a potential attack and falsification of the information trans-
mitted here can result in a malfunction. Attacking the 
CAN network can cause other functions to fail as well, 
but in a Highway pilot function’s case, the ESP is critical. 
False CAN messages can cause the system to build its model 
completely wrong, resulting in unpredictable behavior and 
stability loss. This includes the following effects: unneces-
sary braking, no braking when needed and braking on the 
wrong wheels. This last one makes the situation worse than 
in the previous cases because it makes the vehicle unstable 
and it can cause an accident. For the other two, the same 
applies as in the previous cases; both can be dangerous, 
especially when no braking is applied.
3.4 Speed sensor
Another important component is the speed sensor. This is 
a simpler case since its only failure mode is transmitting 
a false speed signal. Transmitting no signal at all could be 
a different case but the system in the vehicle should be pre-
pared for this, so for our study, these two can be examined 
together as one. In the FMEA, the two potential effects of 
failure are false situation analysis and not the desired amount 
of brake force. A false speed signal can cause serious prob-
lems in the vehicle's systems, since this is the main input 
variable for most. The situation analysis can be false, and 
the wrong functions can be activated. For example, park-
ing assistant functions can move the steering wheel at high 
angles but should only do so, when under certain speed. 
Receiving false speed signals can cause them to become 
active. This can cause a huge risk if there is no protection 
against this on the lower levels of system components.
However, it is relatively easy to protect the system 
from a false speed signal, let it be a simple sensor failure 
or a cyber-attack that caused it. First of all, every subsys-
tem that has speed as one of its main input, has limits to it. 
For instance, a parking assist has to check the vehicle speed 
and it cannot be activated if it is over a specified value. This is 
true for other assistant systems as well, that take the con-
trol from the driver. Furthermore, the speed signal can be 
corrected with the wheel speed signals. This happens in the 
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3.5 Brake sensor
The brake sensor is similar to the speed sensor in a sense 
that it provides a quantitative signal of the vehicles' dynam-
ics. However, the brake signal also has another aspect 
to it, its existence. In the case of the speed sensor, it is not 
enough to know that the vehicle is moving or not, we need 
to know the actual value. In this case, however, often it is 
enough to know that the vehicle is braking; the exact value 
of the brake-force or the deceleration is secondary.
So in this case, as potential failure modes, we can talk 
about false positive and false negative brake signals. A false 
positive signal means that there is an active brake signal that 
does not reflect the actual state of braking. This can cause 
the following effects: the braking is executed with less than 
the desired brake-force; no actual braking is done when nec-
essary. Both scenario can lead to an accident and both can be 
caused by either a sensor failure or a cyber-attack.
A false negative brake signal means that there is no 
brake signal even though the brake force is not zero. This is 
the safer failure mode since the vehicle will eventually 
slow down but even this can create dangerous situations, 
for instance if the system gets no feedback of the actual 
force of the braking and it tries to add more. On the other 
hand, as in the case of the speed sensor, falsifying one sig-
nal will not fool most systems in a vehicle. The speed sen-
sor, the wheel speed sensors and accelerometer signals can 
rule out a false brake signal, so a potential attack would 
have to change these signals as well; this makes the attack-
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4 Summary
This study's goal was not to determine all possible vulnera-
bilities but rather to raise some questions about the possible 
failure modes induced by cyber-attacks in case of automated 
vehicles. The aspects covered by the FMEA are not that broad 
but it gives good insight on possible vulnerabilities starting 
from a method that is well known and practiced in the vehi-
cle industry. From the study, it can be concluded that nowa-
days it is hard to find any parts of a commercial vehicle that 
cannot be compromised by cyber-attacks. In addition, as the 
level of automation slowly increases, more and more subsys-
tems of a vehicle are vulnerable against cyber-attacks.
It is crucial that the communication systems are well 
protected or prepared because this can be a good starting 
point of every cyber-attack. From this segment the ESP 
is the most vulnerable part since in some systems it is 
responsible for executing all vehicle dynamics and if its 
information is compromised, it can lead to dramatic 
results. Two main aspect of this were studied: what hap-
pens if the speed or brake sensor's signal is falsified. It was 
concluded that in most cases, it is not a serious problem 
because of other sensor's data but if the attacker can com-
promise those too, the situation is far worse.
Also important are the camera and radar systems. 
These are more and more widespread and absolutely nec-
essary for any kind of automation. It can be very dan-
gerous if an attacker manages to create or hide objects 
from the camera or radar system, or in the worst case both, 
by overwriting the communication between the ECUs or 
accessing the controllers themselves.
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